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
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Securitization, Desecuritization, and Resecuritization of Indonesian Labor Issues in Saudi Arabia

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Abstract

The presence of Indonesian Workers (TKI) abroad, especially in the Middle East Region, is between the devil and the deep sea. Apart from reducing the government's responsibility to improve the economy by providing job opportunities, their presence also adds to the country's foreign exchange. However, on the other hand, the presence of TKI also adds to the problems caused by the lack of adequate legal protection, inadequate security and welfare guarantees, as well as the ups and downs of Indonesia's bilateral relations with the countries where they work as a result of the problems caused by the TKI themselves. Several policies related to sending migrant workers to the Middle East have been adopted since the time of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, a firm policy was only taken during the administration of President Joko Widodo with the issuance of Minister of Manpower Decree number 260 of 2015 which stopped and prohibited the placement of Indonesian workers with individual users in Middle Eastern countries. This policy can also be seen as a policy that is outside the norm considering that the Middle East is the most popular region for migrant workers. This research attempts to explain how the ups and downs of the TKI issue are seen from a security perspective using a constructivist approach. This process, which the Copenhagen School calls securitization, attempts to place threats and objects that must be secured as products of the process of social interaction. This research will also look at how securitization occurs which is then followed by desecuritization and in its development becomes resecuritization.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia; Securitization; Workforce Replacement; Indonesian Workers

Introduction

The presence of Indonesian Workers (TKI) abroad, especially in the Middle East Region, is between the devil and the deep sea. The presence of migrant workers outside apart from reducing the government's responsibility to improve the economy by providing job opportunities, also adds to the country's foreign exchange (Laksono & Hakim, 2022). However, on the other hand, the presence of TKI also adds to the problems caused by the inadequate legal protection, security and welfare, as well as the ups and downs of Indonesia's bilateral relations with the countries where they work as a result of the problems caused by the TKI themselves (Fadhil, 2013). Furthermore, Fadhil highlighted that cultural differences and perspectives towards TKI also contributed to the emergence of various problems faced by TKI. According to him, Arabs view migrant workers as slaves, where when they order through agents, the transaction is seen as the same as buying and selling slaves.

Middle East is a region with many cases related to Indonesian migrant workers. Djatmiko and Pudyastiwi summarized that there were 27,196 cases in Saudi Arabia, 2,317 cases in Qatar, 2,254 cases in Kuwait, 1,835 cases in Oman, 1,013 cases in Jordan, and 601 cases in Bahrain (Djtmiko & Pudyastiwi, 2019). As the country with the most cases, Saudi Arabia recorded 2,114

cases in Saudi Arabia, 2,317 cases in Qatar, 2,254 cases in Kuwait, 1,835 cases in Oman, 1,013 cases in Jordan, and 601 cases in Bahrain (Djatkiko & Pudyastiwi, 2019). As the country with the most cases, Saudi Arabia recorded 2,114 cases of abuse, 7,197 cases of workplace illnesses, 1,709 cases of sexual harassment, 1,475 cases of unpaid wages and 8,581 cases of unilateral layoffs. The large number of cases has given rise to demands that Indonesia stop sending workers to the Middle East until there is adequate protection for their security and welfare in the destination country.

Several policies related to sending migrant workers to the Middle East have been adopted since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's era. However, a firm policy was only taken during the administration of President Joko Widodo with the issuance of Minister of Manpower Decree number 260 of 2015 which stopped and prohibited the placement of Indonesian workers with individual users in Middle Eastern countries. This ministerial decree was considering

"... there are many problems that befall Indonesian workers who work for individual users and the weak guarantee of protection in Middle Eastern countries, so it is necessary to stop and prohibit the placement of Indonesian workers with individual users in these countries." (Decree of the Minister of Manpower Number 260 of 2015)

The countries included in the Middle East Region according to the Ministerial Decree are Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Egypt, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Jordan. This decision has been in effect since July 1 2015 and was signed by Minister M. Hanif Dhakiri. Even though the decision takes effect immediately, workers who are still working at the time the decision takes effect are still allowed to work until the end of the work agreement, and can even be extended. The decision to terminate and prohibit the placement of workers for individual users in the Middle East region is an extraordinary step if it refers to two things. First, the Middle East is the region (outside ASEAN countries) that currently accommodates the largest number of migrant workers. In fact, even after the moratorium was implemented, even though the numbers were consistent, the Middle East still dominated compared to other regions.

Tabel 1. Number of TKI by Placement (in thousand)

Region	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
ASEAN	2.000	2.004	2.031	2.019	1.731
Asia except ASEAN	375	450	539	648	535
Australia and Oceania	2	1	1	1	1
Middle East	1.112	1.085	1.078	1.071	924
Africa	2	0	0	0	0
America	13	3	0	0	0
Europe	8	5	4	3	1

Source: Bank Indonesia, 2023

From the table, we can see that outside of ASEAN countries, where the majority of migrant workers are placed in neighboring countries, Malaysia, the Middle East region is the largest recipient. There are several reasons why the Middle East is a popular region as a destination for migrant workers to work. The similarity of religions, the high demand for foreign workers, the abundance of information from seniors and the potential for ease of carrying out the Hajj or Umrah are some of the reasons for the popularity of the Middle East Region, especially Saudi

Arabia (Tobing, 1990). Second, the majority of Indonesian migrant workers are workers with low education and low skills. The jobs that available for them are jobs in the domestic sector with individual users such as housemaids, baby carers, cooks, and caretakers of the elderly (Ismail, 2019). Thus, stopping and prohibiting the sending of migrant workers to individual users in countries in the Middle East region is the same as stopping the opportunity for many prospective workers to earn income in the region.

Three years after the moratorium, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia agreed on bilateral cooperation which regulates the placement of workers through one channel (Public Relations Bureau of the Ministry of Manpower, 2018). In the agreement signed by the Minister of Manpower of the Republic of Indonesia, M. Hanif Dhakiri, with the Minister of Manpower and Social Development of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ahmed bin Suleiman bin Abdulaziz al Rajhi in Jakarta, 11 October 2018, TKI will no longer work under the kafalah (individual employer) system, but rather with the syarikah system. (i.e. a company appointed and responsible to the government of Saudi Arabia). However, Minister Hanif explained that this agreement does not revoke Ministerial Regulation No. 260 of 2015 concerning Termination and Prohibition of Placement of TKI with Individual Users, but instead enforces this regulation.

Policies related to the protection of migrant workers in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, are product of dialogue or interaction between several actors on this issue, the government, migrant workers, and NGOs that concern on migrant workers. This interaction process in turn constructs the actor's understanding of the threat to the security of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, who is threatened, how the public will respond and what actions should be taken. On this basis, researchers attempt to provide an explanation of this process through the Copenhagen School constructivist approach, known as the securitization process. Securitization itself is generally a process that attempts to construct a security threat to certain parties so that extraordinary steps are needed to protect it. The unconventional steps referred to in this research are related to the moratorium on sending workers to Saudi Arabia (and Middle Eastern countries in general) which Indonesia has never taken before, even though it often appears as a discourse. This research seeks to describe how the processes of securitization, desecuritization and resecuritization occur in the issue of Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia?

Security is important in International Relations. Paul D. Williams in his book said that world politics would not make sense without examining security (Williams, 2008). Furthermore, Baylis said that security is a contested concept (Baylis et al., 2020). According to him, although experts have basically agreed on the definition that security means being free from threats, they still debate about the object being secured, whether it is individual, national, international, or global. Another expert, Emma Rothschild, argues that the meaning of security can be different if interpreted at different times and in different places depending on what must be protected and what threats are faced (Rothschild, 1995). Therefore, added Rothschild, security studies must move beyond the traditional concept of security which revolves around "securing the state" by accommodating non-traditional security which surrounds people and the environment.

In 1983, Barry Buzan, through his book, *People, States and Fear*, also argued that security is not always just about the state but also all human collectivities (Buzan, 1983). According to Buzan, security for the human collectivity lies in the following five sectors:

1. Military

Security in this sector focuses on the "game" of a country's offensive and defensive capabilities which are also influenced by one country's perception of the intentions of the vice versa country. In order not to mix with security studies in general, Buzan suggested that security studies in the military sector merge into strategic studies.

2. Politics

In this sector, security is related to the stability of the country and the government system. Apart from that, this sector also includes ideology as a provider of state legitimacy.

3. Economy

This sector is related to access to resources, finance and markets needed to achieve

prosperity.

4. Community

This sector is related to the existence of society, including cultural customs, language, religion and national identity.

5. Environment

This is a sector that focuses on maintaining nature and the environment as systems that support human life.

The definition of security is often inseparable from the tradition of thought that surrounds it (Williams, 2008). Realism, for example, although identified by Colin Elman as having 6 different variants, is equally oriented towards the state as an object that must be secured (Elman, 2008). This thinking reached its peak during the cold war. After "weakening" after the Cold War, where a lot of optimism emerged with the new world order, but with the many conflicts and wars that occurred, this tradition strengthened again to explain security, conflict and war. Liberalism, on the other hand, emphasizes democracy, reducing the role of government in the economy and the role of international institutions in preventing and mitigating international conflicts (Navari, 2008).

In the realm of International Relations, Immanuel Kant believes that a country with a republican government (a government based on law and a constitution) is a good country. He believes that republican countries are "peacemakers" and have more peaceful behavior compared to other countries (Navari, 2008). Trade liberal recipes for international peace, also known as "economic disarmament", include: reducing the government's authority to implement trade barriers, opening currency trade, reducing tariffs to a minimum and prohibiting quotas and other quantity restrictions. Adherents of liberal institutionalism such as Robert Keohane (1983) and Robert Axelrod (1984) believe that institutions, although they cannot eliminate anarchic conditions in the international system, can change the character of the system by influencing state preferences and behavior (Navari, 2008).

Constructivism, after Cold War, becomes an increasingly important approach in international relations. By combining sociological approaches and Critical Theory, the basic foundation of this thinking is the belief that the world, definitions, theories and concepts in international relations are the product of intersubjective interactions (McDonald, 2008). Constructivism believes that all "reality" in world politics is the result of social construction, including security. This means, from a constructivist perspective, the term security itself is a social construction. Insecurity is not caused by an anarchic system, as realists believe, but we ourselves are the ones who actually create that insecurity. Constructivists also believe that non-material or ideational factors are important in the construction and practice of security in world politics (McDonald, 2008). Therefore, constructivism tends not to create universal concepts and definitions of security. Because security is part of social construction, all variables in security, including the objects being secured, are products of social construction. By the Copenhagen School the security production process is referred to as securitization.

Securitization was initiated by the Copenhagen School scholars, such as Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap di Wilde. Securitization is defined as the process of constructing the existence of a threat to a particular object which then encourages the implementation of extraordinary measures to protect that object (Buzan et al., 1998). Extraordinary measures are steps or procedures outside the norm that cannot be taken by the state (as the actor authorized to protect the object in question) under normal conditions. In this construction effort, certain actors carry out speech acts to convince the audience that the threat is real so that the audience will support and in turn encourage the adoption of extraordinary steps or procedures to protect the object in question. Thus, securitization is an intersubjective process to construct threats to certain objects.

"If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules that he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization." (Buzan et al., 1998)

As a process, securitization has several stages. The first stage is speech act. At this stage the securitization actor tries to construct the existence of a threat to the object that must be protected (referent object). The issue that is "securitized" is not initially considered a security threat (existential threat). However, at this stage, by securitization actors, the issue is constructed through framing, in such a way that it can be accepted as a security threat. The target of this process is the audience because they are the ones who decide whether the threat is real or not (Buzan et al, 1998). The audience here is assumed to be the wider community because securitization itself is a process that allows it to occur in liberal democratic countries where the public's voice is heard (Roe, 2008).

"securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value?... permission to override the rules that would otherwise bind." (Roe, 2008).

Even though in the speech act process there is "negotiation" between the securitization actor and the audience, the audience's approval is crucial because they are the ones who will provide legitimacy for the implementation of extraordinary steps. Securitization actors who carry out speech acts can be political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, or pressure groups who do so in channels that allow their statements, explanations and policies to reach the public (Buzan et al., 1998). The next stage is acceptance by the public. As stated previously, this stage is crucial because public acceptance is what determines whether extraordinary steps can be taken. The language factor is important in this process because the use of appropriate language will be able to convince the public that the threat being securitized is real and extraordinary steps must be taken (Buzan et al., 1998). The final stage, which according to Buzan et al. determines the occurrence of securitization, is the existence of extraordinary measures which in normal situations would not be carried out (Buzan et al., 1998). This extraordinary action can be in the form of a warning or promise of protection for the referent object (Floyd, 2016). Successful securitization is when the warning or promise is realized in practice.

Method

This research is qualitative research. Qualitative research is research that intends to understand phenomena as a whole, including by describing them in the form of words and language (Moleong, 2014). Therefore, this research seeks to provide a comprehensive picture of securitization, desecuritization and resecuritization of the issue of Indonesian Workers in Saudi Arabia. This research uses primary and secondary data collected from various sources including legal documents, official statements, government speech texts, newspapers, magazines/bulletins/periodical publications and other secondary sources of information.

Results

Securitization

In the context of the TKI issue, which will be further elaborated through securitization, desecuritization and resecuritization, it is necessary to look at the beginning of the main thing, namely securitization. In Securitization Theory, the initial stages of securitization efforts are viewed starting from the speech acts carried out by securitizing actors as a form of securitizing move. With the aim of proving that the issue raised is an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998). Speech acts are efforts made by actors (securitizing actors) to provide arguments regarding the existence of a real threat (existential threat). Securitizing actors can be a country's government, politicians, figures, organizations, or society. The arguments issued by securitizing actors usually center on protecting the security of the state, nation, as well as culture, principles and systems. Securitizing actors tend not to discuss security issues for themselves, so they are not referent objects (objects that must be protected) that are existentially threatened. In the initial stage, namely speech act, the author will look at it from two securitizing actors, Indonesian Government and NGO, namely

Migrant Care.

Judging from the first actor, namely the Indonesian Government, before signing the moratorium policy through Decree of the Minister of Manpower number 260 of 2015, there were various statements or expressions by the Indonesian Government to convince the public as an audience that concrete steps were needed to overcome the issue of migrant workers. One year before the moratorium was signed, namely in 2014, the Indonesian government under the leadership of Jokowi-JK said clearly that it wanted to stop sending migrant workers abroad (Dewanto, 2014). This is in accordance with Nawa Cita's agenda during the pair's campaign in the Jokowi-JK vision and mission document, the first point of which is written "to bring back the state to take care of the entire nation and provide a sense of security for all citizens" (KLHK, 2017). Several months after being inaugurated as President, Jokowi stated that he wanted to stop sending Indonesian workers abroad because it was closely related to the nation's self-respect and dignity. Jokowi stated:

"I gave a target to the Minister of Manpower to make a clear roadmap, and when we will stop sending domestic workers. We must have self-respect and dignity." (Wismabrata, 2015).

Jokowi stated this in February 2015, and M. Dhakiri Hanif as Minister of Manpower at that time responded well (Republic of Indonesia Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). The Minister of Manpower also stated that this is an issue that deserves to be highlighted, especially as there are many migrant workers who have discrepancies and incompatibilities with customs abroad in terms of personal protection. Hanif stated:

"Seeing the suffering of migrant workers who work abroad, our honor and dignity as a nation is torn apart. I think that's what Mr President feels. I also feel the same way." (Republic of Indonesia Cabinet Secretariat, 2015).

In line with the statement in February 2015, the Minister of Manpower also agreed to follow up on the President's direction by preparing a roadmap and steps towards stopping the sending of TKI (Republic of Indonesia Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). Not only the Minister of Manpower, but BNP2TKI (National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers) also highlighted the issue of TKI that year which was expressed by Nusron Wahid as Head of BNP2TKI stating: "Essentially, we are ready to secure the President's orders. As a great nation, we must raise the honor and dignity of the nation" (Detiknews, 2015). Not only the Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI, but Commission VIII DPR-RI also said that the issue of TKI is an issue that deserves to be highlighted and concrete steps are needed. Itet Tridjajati Sumarijanto, supports Jokowi's direction to stop sending migrant workers abroad because according to him this is related to the dignity of the nation because it is not uncommon for migrant workers to be treated arbitrarily by being punished and tortured by their employers (Nasrul, 2015).

Based on the three statements and one news item, it appears that the state as an actor has attempted to highlight the issue of migrant workers as an important issue. Starting from the highest level, namely President Jokowi, Ministry of Manpower, BNP2TKI, to Commission VIII DPR-RI. However, several months after this directive, namely in April, there was the issue of a migrant worker in Saudi Arabia, namely Siti Zainab, who was unfortunately executed after being found guilty of the murder of her employer Noura al-Morobei (BBC News, 2015). After the news, many parties regretted this, especially regarding the Indonesian Government's commitment to protecting migrant workers abroad. Strong criticism was also expressed by NGOs such as Migrant Care, which considered that the Indonesian Government's steps to protect migrant workers had not been implemented optimally. Anis Hidayah, Executive Director of Migrant Care said:

"Because I think the consecutive executions (in Saudi Arabia) are the worst precedent we have ever had in our diplomatic system with other countries." (Setyawan, 2015).

Wahyu Susilo as Policy Analyst from Migrant Care also urged the Indonesian Government to be more serious in advocating for problematic Indonesian migrants, especially those threatened with the death penalty (Rahadian, 2015). In this case, Migrant Care as a non-profit organization is quite vocal and critical in responding to migrant issues, which means that Migrant Care is also a securitizing actor in the issue of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. The continuation of the protests launched by these NGOs was the emergence of Jokowi's statement one month after the execution of Siti Zainab.

In a short time, the Indonesian Government implemented a moratorium which was enshrined in Minister of Manpower Decree Number 260 of 2015. This decision stopped and prohibited the placement of Indonesian workers with individual users in Middle Eastern countries. This policy applies to all destination countries in the Middle East, namely Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Egypt, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, South Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen and Jordan (detikNews, 2015). The reason this moratorium was implemented at that time was based on instructions from the President as well as recommendations from a number of Indonesian ambassadors and embassies in Middle Eastern countries. Hanif said on the Ministry of Manpower's official Facebook page:

"With the roadmap to stop domestic worker migrant workers, all sending and placement of domestic workers to 21 Middle Eastern countries is prohibited and falls into the category of criminal acts of trafficking. This policy is also based on President Joko Widodo's direction in February 2015 which requested that placement TKI domestic workers are stopped. And based on recommendations from a number of Indonesian ambassadors and embassies in Middle Eastern countries who asked that the placement of Indonesian domestic workers be stopped." (Ministry of Manpower of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015)

Starting from the Nawa Cita which was promoted by Jokowi-JK during the 2014 presidential election, and strengthened by several instructions from the President in February after the election of Jokowi-JK as head of government, at the same time it was exacerbated by the issue of migrant workers being sentenced to death in Saudi Arabia, so the moratorium implemented to stop the placement of migrant workers in the Middle East. The seriousness of the Indonesian government in the issue of migrant workers was only proven in May after the execution of Siti Zainab.

Desecuritization

The Minister of Manpower's Decree Number 260 of 2015 which prohibits the placement of Indonesian workers with individual users in Middle Eastern countries apparently does not solve the problem. After this moratorium was implemented, several parties asked for the moratorium to be lifted. The most recent one occurred on August 3 2023. Hundreds of people from the general public and students demonstrated at the Horse Statue, Jalan Merdeka Barat demanding the revocation of Minister of Manpower Decree No. 260 of 2015 (Nurdin, 2023). They argue that the existence of the moratorium is miserable because it prevents people from working and getting a better life by becoming migrant workers in the Middle East Region.

The narration for lifting the moratorium was also conveyed by the Head of the Center for Migration Studies, Migrant Care, Anis Hidayah. According to him, the existence of the moratorium has an impact on increasing human trafficking. This is because workers still insist on leaving but through unofficial channels (Antara, 2019). Saudi Arabia is indeed a favorite country for illegal migrant workers, according to the Indonesian Migrant Worker Protection Agency (BP2MI) (Akbar, 2023). The Main Secretary of BP2MI, Rinardi, in detik.com once said that Saudi Arabia is the favorite country for illegal migrant workers because of the ease of entry into the country. Rinardi said that if Malaysia (the second favorite country) is easy to enter because it has a direct border with Indonesia, so there are many entrances, then Saudi Arabia is easy to reach because to get to that country you only need an Umrah visa or pilgrimage visa.

If in the securitization process the dominant actors are NGOs and the government, when the policy as a result of the process has been taken, it is these two actors who actually reduce the

degree of urgency of the policy. From the government side, three years after implementing the moratorium, it actually made an agreement with Saudi Arabia regarding the placement of workers in the country (Public Relations Bureau of the Ministry of Manpower, 2018). The agreement is related to changes to the placement system where TKI will no longer work for individuals but will work for a syarikah or company that will be appointed by the Saudi Arabian government. This agreement then became the basis for the birth of Minister of Manpower Decree Number 291 of 2018 concerning Guidelines for Implementing the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the One Channel Placement System.

In June 2023, through the One Channel Placement System (SPSK) scheme, the Minister of Manpower, Ida Fauziah released 100 domestic sector workers to Saudi Arabia (Mahrofi, 2023). This is the first implementation of the agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which was signed by Minister M. Hanif Dhakiri from Indonesia with Minister Ahmed bin Suleiman bin Abdulaziz al Rajhi from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Jakarta 11 October 2018. The agreement contains the provision that TKI will no longer work in individual employers, but on one company channel appointed by the Saudi Arabian government, which is then manifested in Minister of Manpower Decree No. 291/2018 concerning Guidelines for Implementing the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the One Channel Placement System (SPSK).

Desecuritization of Indonesian migrant workers' issue in Saudi Arabia reached its peak when in August 2023 the government stated that it had revoked Minister of Manpower Decree number 260/2015 concerning Termination and Prohibition of the Placement of Indonesian Workers with Individual Users in Middle Eastern Countries. In a press release, Minister of Manpower Ida Fauziyah said that the placement of TKI in the domestic sector for the Middle East region was carried out by referring back to Law No. 18/2017 concerning the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Fauzan, 2023). On the same occasion, the government also revoked Minister of Manpower Decree no. 291/2018 concerning Guidelines for Implementing the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the One Channel Placement System (SPSK). This desecuritization received approval from the public when one of the NGOs for migrant issues, Migrant Watch, welcomed the decision.

The Executive Director of Migrant Watch, Aznil Tan, said that the Minister of Manpower Decree number 260/2015 and number 291/2018 shackles people's freedom to work (Nugroho, 2023). This statement was made after a dialogue between Migrant Watch, students and the Indonesian Migrant Workers Concern Union in the Office of the Minister of Manpower, Ida Fauziyah. This revocation also received a positive response from NGOs for another migrant issue, Migrant Care. Executive Director of Migrant Care, Wahyu Susilo, said that the regulations that were revoked were contradictory from the start (Lombok Post, 2023). It is contradictory because in one regulation, Minister of Manpower Decree number 260/2015, prohibits the placement of TKI but in another regulation, number 291/2018, allows it but with certain conditions. According to Wahyu, this dualism of rules in practice actually causes confusion in society. Furthermore, he also said that the issuance of this policy was not accompanied by strict supervision, so it actually encouraged migrant workers to take an unprocedural route. One year since the policy was implemented, Migrant Care recorded 1020 new non-procedural domestic workers in the Middle East (Lombok Post, 2023).

Resecuritization

It turns out that the lifting of the moratorium on placing migrant workers to the Middle East region was not fully accepted by the community. General Chairperson of the Indonesian Migrant Workers Federation, Ali Nurdin Abdurahman, rejected this policy (JPNN, 2023). According to him, the moratorium policy is still relevant because improvements to the management of placements in Middle Eastern countries still need to be carried out. According to him, a moratorium still needs to be implemented as long as there is no guarantee of sufficient protection in the destination country. Moreover, there are still several old cases that have not been handled (JPNN, 2023).

At the end of October 2023, after 16 years of being considered missing because he had never had contact with his family, a TKI from Indramayu Regency suddenly appeared via video footage that went viral on social media. In the 59 second video circulating in cyberspace, the female migrant worker named Warsini hopes that Jokowi and the Regent of Indramayu, Nina Agustina, will help her return to her hometown (Syahrial, 2023). Knowing this, the family reported it to the Indramayu branch of the Indonesian Migrant Workers Union (SBMI). Based on information from the family, Warsini left for Saudi Arabia in 2007 and there was no news after that. Until April 2023, Warsini started to get sick, and finally got a cellphone from his employer (Syahrial, 2023). Through searching on social media, Warsini was finally able to contact his family.

Previously, on October 2 2023, a similar video was also present on social media. Rini, a migrant worker from Cianjur, admitted that she was being held captive in Saudi Arabia. According to the family's attorney, Rini's whereabouts are still unclear because the foreign ministry has not yet provided a definite answer (Sofyan, 2023). The existence of these two cases has given rise to the narrative that protecting migrant workers in Saudi Arabia is still homework for the Indonesian government. Coupled with protests over the moratorium lifting policy, it shows that at the end of 2023 a resecuritization process related to the issue of Indonesian migrant workers is underway.

Discussion

The securitization process occurs when speech acts carried out by securitizing actors (Government and NGOs), where the Indonesian Government consisting of President Jokowi, the Ministry of Manpower, BNP2TKI, and Commission VIII DPR-RI attempt to show that the issue of TKI is an issue that is a potential threat to the country. Not only from the Government, Migrant Care as an NGO also highlights this issue and it will threaten the stability of the country because it is related to the protection of citizens in other countries. The Indonesian government and NGOs wanted to prove to the audience that they were taking this issue seriously and finally signed a moratorium as a form of securitization of the issue of migrant workers in the Middle East.

Then in its development, the moratorium policy received opposition from other audiences, thus "forcing" the government to review its policy. When a new policy is adopted as a revision of the previous policy, accompanied by public approval as an audience, it shows that the desecuritization process has occurred. The issue of placing migrant workers in the Middle East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular is no longer considered a security issue, so the policy that emerged as a response to the increasing threat to migrant workers in Saudi Arabia was deemed unnecessary and was subsequently revoked. The emergence of new cases in 2023 has raised the issue of the government's weakness in providing protection to migrant workers. This issue has again given rise to speech acts from several actors indicating efforts to re-securitize the issue of placing migrant workers in Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

The issue of Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia experiences never-ending ups and downs. Case after case occurs without any significant improvement. The emergence of policies to deal with these cases seems to only show a reactive government attitude without considering long-term impacts and comprehensive protection. The securitization of the issue that prompted the adoption of a moratorium policy on the distribution of labor for individual users in the Middle East was only a short reaction to cases involving migrant workers, one of which was in Saudi Arabia. This policy then actually encourages desecuritization which reduces the urgency of the policy itself. Desecuritization efforts which were also carried out by the same actors, the government, and NGOs, resulted in the abolition of the moratorium in 2023. In the same year, new cases emerged which were then responded to with the need to carry out the moratorium again until better protection could be provided by the government through making an agreement related protection to the destination country.

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